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INTRODUCTION
Historians have become increasingly aware of the difficulty and
inaccuracy of assigning the economic and social structures of modern
societies to specific categories. In fact, at any given point a single
group may incorporate economic arrangements ranging from the
relative simplicity of barter to the complexities of international trade
and finance. The village may well remain the primary social and
political focus of most of the population in a society which, on another
level, has all the trappings of a modern nation-state.
The colonial society which developed in Fiji after 1880 appears,
on first perusal, to provide a classic example of this phenomenon in
that it incorporated a tribal, village people engaged in subsistence
agriculture, a wage-earning agricultural proletariat, a modern
government bureaucracy, and a capitalist class with large-scale
enterprises tied to the world economy. But in actuality the Fijian
case is unique. This multi-faceted society came about as the calculated
creation of Fiji's British rulers and was sustained by British law. As
such, it reflected that peculiar blend of idealism and pragmatism
which characterized British imperialism in general and the admini-
stration of Fiji's first British governor, Sir Arthur Hamilton Gordon,
in particular.
I. THE BRITISH ACQUISITION OF FIJI
The interplay of these attitudes actually characterized the British
presence in the area long before the acquisition of the islands and
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Gordon's arrival on the scene. Due to a boom in cotton planting,
Fiji's resident European population had been increasing from the
1860's on. With this new resident population, composed for the most
part of British subjects, came increasing disorder and disputes with
the native population over questions of land titles and labor demands.
The obvious insecurities of the situation led, as early as i860, to
requests for British acquisition of the islands. At this point, however,
British colonial policy was not yet affected by that feverish sense of
urgency and competition which led European powers in the last
quarter of the 19th Century to acquire practically every unclaimed
square foot of the earth's surface.
The British Colonial Office proceeded with extreme caution.
Inquiries were made of one Colonel Smythe, an observer on the
scene, as to the feasibility of acquisition. Would Fiji be a useful
station for mail steamers between Panama and Sydney? Could it
provide a dependable supply of cotton for British mills? Would the
British presence be able to suppress cannibalism and other "social
evils" without incurring prohibitive costs? Smythe reported negatively
in each case, and the Colonial Office stood firm in its opposition to
such an unpromising enterprise.1
Yet by 1874, the Colonial Secretary, Lord Carnarvon, was
informing the House of Lords that " . . . i t would not be safe to fold
our arms and say we would not have anything to do with the Islands."2
And on October 10, 1874, Britain formally accepted the outright
cession of Fiji proffered by its make-shift native government. In
strategic and economic terms, however, little had changed. If
anything, a drop in cotton prices and the subsequent failure of many
Fijian plantations should have made acquisition even less attractive
than it had been in the preceding decade. Pragmatic considerations
cannot explain this policy reversal. The new factors at work in
determining Fijian policy were those of idealism.
To define these factors as idealistic is, however, not to diminish
their power in the politics of Victorian England. For if 19th-Century
Britain was the stronghold of industry and empire, it was also a society
characterized by a revitalized evangelical Christianity, liberal reform,
and Victorian morality. When British public opinion could be brought
to focus on the moral or humanitarian aspects of a given issue,
politicians ignored it at their own peril. It was indeed "not safe" in
terms of domestic politics. Thus while British policy-makers responded
to the fairly standard considerations of 19th-century European
imperialism (i.e. profit, prestige, military strategy), they also had to
141
respond to Victorian England's peculiar vision of its mission to civilize
and protect.
By the 1870s, the moral and humanitarian aspects of the Fijian
question were increasingly being brought to the attention of the
British public, largely by those working in the missionary effort in
the Pacific. There was a new awareness of the threat to the very
survival of indigenous peoples posed by the European presence. In
the period between i860 and 1873, the Fijian population had declined
from 200,000 to 170,000. By 1881, after a disastrous measles epidemic,
the native population had dropped to 114,748.3 Moreover, the
settlers' demands for land and labor were incomprehensible to
traditional Fijian society and threatened to overwhelm it. Although
the concept of permanent alienation of land hardly existed among the
Fijians, for example, by the time of the Cession of 1874, the settlers
were claiming title to more land than actually existed in Fiji.
By the 1870s, the missionaries had, in addition to general problems
of cultural disruption, a specific issue which was all but guaranteed
to arouse public interest in the plight of Fiji. This was the Pacific
Islands labor trade. The labor trade to Fiji arose in response to the
labor requirements of the cotton planters in the 1860s. They found
the local Fijian population unwilling to undertake disagreeable labor
from which they derived nothing of traditional value. So between
1864 and 1869, over a thousand laborers from the New Hebrides, and
the Gilbert and Ellice Islands were recruited as indentured laborers
for the plantations of Fiji. In the boom atmosphere of the early
cotton-planting years, no one, least of all the planters, was overly
scrupulous about the nature of this recruitment.4 By 1869 even the
British Foreign Secretary was warning that Britain risked "the
mortification of seeing a systematic Slave Trade breaking out in a
new Quarter."5 Nothing could have been better calculated to send
a chill up the collective spine of Victorian England. Only thirty years
previously the abolition of the slave trade in all British possessions
had been one of the focal points of English reform movements, and
memories of that struggle were still vivid.
In 1871, as if to vindicate the missionary-reformer position, Bishop
Patteson, the Anglican missionary bishop of the Pacific, was murdered
in the Solomon Islands by islanders who apparently had mistaken his
group for the despised labor recruiters. Partly as a consequence of
this unfortunate incident, Parliament enacted the Pacific Islander
Protection Act which required all vessels engaged in the labor trade
to have a license from either a British consul or an Australian
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governor. But the prevailing view among reform groups in England
was that this measure was both inadequate and unenforceable. As
long as Fiji, the center of this iniquitous trade, remained unstable and
unregulated, abuses would continue. Not surprisingly, both the
Aborigines Protection Society and the Anti-Slavery Society cam-
paigned vigorously in Parliament for the acceptance of the Cession
of Fiji in 1874.6
However, even the staunchest advocates of humane and protective
measures did not envision a very innovative role for the new govern-
ment of Fiji. If the government corrected the worst abuses of the
labor trade, checked the most exploitive planters and provided law
and order, it would have done its duty. If it could also encourage
industrious habits and Christian virtues and otherwise help the
indigenous population along the road to civilization, so much the
better.7 To these criteria, the Colonial Office would certainly have
added that the new colony must absolutely not become an economic
burden for the British taxpayer. In short, the scheme of government
for Fiji envisioned by most of the interested parties in 1874 was rather
simple and undemanding. Contrary to these expectations, British
government in Fiji extended its law and order function to become the
preserver and protector of an entire indigenous culture. This remark-
able development was almost exclusively the work of Sir Arthur
Hamilton Gordon, the first British Governor of Fiji.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF GORDON'S NATIVE POLICY
No one could have disputed Gordon's qualifications for the new
post. Although only 45, he had 15 years experience as a colonial
governor, serving first in New Brunswick, and then in Trinidad and
the Mauritius Islands. The two latter posts gave him, in the Colonial
Office's view, invaluable experience in dealing with "native peoples."
His family background was impeccable, a matter of no small
consequence in a Britain where politics remained a largely aristocratic
preserve. His father, Lord Aberdeen, had been Prime Minister.
Gladstone was a family friend who had once employed Gordon as his
secretary.
What was less obvious but far more critical for the development of
Fiji were Gordon's singular ambition and his own peculiar vision of
the British mission. "I feel," he confessed, "an excessive desire to be
eminent. . . and though I feel that it can never make me happy,
I still most earnestly desire greatness and power."8 It is safe to assume
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that he defined greatness and power in terms of bettering the human
lot and establishing his own place in history rather than as material
gain. He was always well-to-do despite his later complaints concern-
ing the strain on his resources incurred by his colonial posts. More
importantly, he had from childhood been surrounded by the major
British political figures of the day, almost all of whom were fierce
advocates of the Victorian virtues of progress and reform. As a
student, he also absorbed, through the so-called Oxford Movement
which emphasized intensified religious feeling, a religious sensibility
which remained with him throughout his life. Finally, Gordon had a
born aristocrat's sense of noblesse oblige which, combined with a proper
dose of Victorian self-confidence, convinced him that, left alone, he
could achieve something worthwhile.
Gordon's colonial record, prior to 1874, provides ample evidence
of these humanitarian, reformist predilections. His efforts to improve
the lot of Trinidad's Indian indentured laborers, for example, resulted
in a drop in the mortality rate for workers in their first year's residence
from 12% in 1865 to 4% by 1869.9 Still, Fiji presented Gordon with
a new and unique opportunity to fulfill his ambitions. To begin with,
it had the inestimable advantage, in Gordon's view, of being a simple
Grown Colony where policy would be largely a matter of the
governor's initiative. Aside from the lack of troublesome parliamen-
tary, consultative bodies of the sort which had driven him to distraction
in New Brunswick, Fiji's lack of strategic or economic importance
meant that the Colonial Office might leave him alone (a hope not
fully realized). The planters, too, appeared to have insufficient
numbers and wealth to be a major obstacle to the governor's will.
And most enticing of all, Fiji offered the prospect of devising a
system of rule for a still viable native culture. A Victorian idealist
with aristocratic leanings could hardly have asked for more. Thus,
when he queried Carnarvon as to whether the intention was that
"Fiji be regarded as a position to be held or as a colony to be
developed," the question seems rather rhetorical.10 And in Carnarvon,
he found the support necessary for the pursuit of his vision of Fiji.
What exactly was this vision? It might be just as well to establish
what it was not. However advanced his thinking, Gordon was still a
19th-century man, and it would be inaccurate to suggest that his
Fijian policy was entirely outside that context. It is unlikely that he
was ever absolutely opposed to the economic development of the
islands or even to the planters per se. In an 1875 speech to the
assembled planters, he declared "my sympathy for the colored races
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is strong, but my sympathy for my own race is stronger."11 Nor is
there any indication that he ever envisioned Fiji as some sort of
anthropological preserve where the indigenous population would
remain frozen in time.
What was distinctive in Gordon's outlook was the realization that
native society was an integrated, complex system which required an
integrated approach if it was to be governed effectively. "The moral
sense of a semi-civilized race," he wrote to Carnarvon, "is often very
unlike our own, but is not on that account the less real; and it would
be a great mistake to suppose that it does not exercise a most powerful
influence upon thought and action. It is therefore of the utmost
importance to seize, if possible, the spirit in which native institutions
have been framed and endeavor to work them as to develop to the
utmost possible extent the latent capacities of the people for the
management of their own affairs, without exciting their suspicion or
destroying their self-respect."12
The Fijians, as Gordon encountered them in 1875, seemed to
vindicate all his views. Within weeks of his arrival, he was writing to
Gladstone praising their high regard for women, their level of
education, their industriousness, and even their language which he
found remarkably similar to Greek. Their state of civilization
resembled, he thought, that of the Highland Scots some 400 years
earlier.13 This is a most instructive comparison, for it implies that
Gordon saw Fijian culture as part and parcel of the human process
of civilization and not as something unchanging and apart. It had
in it the same possibilities, the same potential as other civilizations,
if it could be given some protection from the European presence
which threatened to overwhelm it.
The key elements in the development of Gordon's native policy
were, then, his conviction that native society was a complex affair
presently capable of managing many of its own affairs and poten-
tially capable of evolving a full-fledged civilization, and the absolute
necessity of protecting this society from the certain ruin too rapid
change would bring. It is perhaps not too much to suggest that an
understanding of all Gordon's actions in Fiji depends on an apprecia-
tion of these points. It could be argued that given Fiji's remoteness, the
lack of administrative personnel, and the need to pacify a suspicious
population, a native rule policy was the only practical alternative
available to Gordon. But was it? Certainly these same limitations
occurred elsewhere in the Pacific without producing the elaborate,
highly integrated system of native involvement that Gordon and his
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aides devised. Moreover, one is struck by Gordon's sense of beleaguer-
ment in trying to preserve his policies in the face of opposition from
planters, missionaries, and elements in the Colonial Office. It hardly
seems likely that so much ire would have been generated by a more
conventional administrator less intent on innovation. Rather, it seems
more logical to assume that the implementation and protection of the
ideals embodied in his native policy became the first priorities of
Gordon's regime. Convenience and thrift mattered much less than
what he saw as the obligation of Western Civilization to native
peoples.
Gordon's scheme for the protection of the delicate organism of
Fijian society involved a three-part program of non-alienation of
native land, native control of native affairs exercised through a
permanent Council of Chiefs, and a taxation system based on pay-
ment in produce rather than cash. Land reform, which culminated
in the Land Ordinance of 1881, stemmed partly from the chaos over
land titles which was the legacy of the early years of European
settlement and partly from the government's realization that Fijian
society had to have this base if it was to survive. A land commission
was appointed which, after having conferred a fairly generous
settlement on the planters, established the principle that land had
traditionally been held by the entire community or mataqali and that
there had been no permanent alienation of these holdings. Whether
such a principle actually had governed land tenure is questionable,
since by the mid-1870s traditional practice had been corrupted to
such an extent that not even the Fijian chiefs were really clear on the
matter. But Gordon, perhaps taking his clue from the speculations of
the missionary-anthropologist, Lorimer Fison, thought it might well
have been so. In any case, the Land Ordinance of 1880 solved the
critical problem of unlimited European land claims which, had they
gone unchecked, would have destroyed the Fijians' economic
independence.14
This land policy dovetailed neatly with the second aspect of
Gordon's program, native administration of native affairs. The key
element here was the authority of the traditional chiefs, which
Gordon saw as the best bet for holding Fijian society together. He
therefore enhanced that authority by making them responsible for
land distribution within the Fijian community and the administration
of a new law code based on Fijian customary law. Moreover, with
the formation of a permanent Council of Chiefs, they had an
important advisory role in the government itself.15 Gordon further
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enhanced their prestige by carefully grafting British authority onto
the traditional system. The governor became, in Gordon's presenta-
tion, the high chief. To make this point, he even went so far as to
hold daily yaqona drinking ceremonials at Government House.16
But the real work horse of the native policy was Gordon's taxation
scheme. Using a system based on E.B. Money's How to Govern a Colony,
an account of Dutch administration in Java, Gordon proposed
replacing the head tax payable in cash or labor with a tax payable
in cash crops raised in the village which would then be sold by
government agents. The benefits of such a system were legion in
terms of preserving Fijian society. The authority of the chiefs would
be strengthened since they were charged with assessment, super-
vision, and labor distribution. Agriculture and industrious habits
would be encouraged. The Fijians would gain experience in the
production of cash crops, thus gaining knowledge of the western
economic system which would better equip them to deal with
European traders. Most important of all, the system would put an
end to the depopulation and cultural ercsion of the village which had
been a very serious consequence of the need to earn cash to pay taxes.17
In other words, taxation in kind meant that the Fijian could stay in
the village and continue to be a Fijian.
This scheme, so ideal in terms of Gordon's vision, was the source
of all manner of difficulty between Gordon and his two other consti-
tuencies, the planters and the Colonial Office. For it must be
remembered that Gordon had to discharge his responsibilities to them
as well as to the Fijians. The planters, to reiterate, were British
subjects who fully expected government co-operation in their quest
for economic stability. Unfortunately, their hopes of economic
success were geared to plantation agriculture which required a
dependable supply of labor. Pacific Island labor, for reasons which
will be explored, was a fading hope, and now Gordon's taxation
scheme deprived them of the readily available alternative, the Fijians.
The outcry was tremendous. "My greatest difficulty," Gordon wrote
to Gladstone, "will be in resistance of the unreasonable demands of
the planters for slave labor."18
While Carnarvon remained steadfast in his support, Gordon was
fully aware that other elements in the Colonial Office gave ear to
the planters' complaints and favored unrestrained development. Foi
if the liberalism which dominated the British politics of the day was
reformist and moralistic, it was equally devoted to laissez-faire
economics. There were those, said Gordon, who held that "natives
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have no rights, and that though their interests should be regarded,
if any—even the most important interest of the native is opposed to
any—even the slightest interest of the settlers, it must of necessity be
set aside."19
Moreover, the guiding principle of the Colonial Office throughout
the period continued to be economic self-sufficiency. Britain had at
the time of the cession assumed the financial obligations of the
short-lived native government and had made an outright grant to
cover the costs of establishing the colonial administration. But now
the time had come for the colony to generate its own income. While
Gordon's taxation scheme brought in more income than the head tax,
it was not enough to fund administration, much less cover the costs
of his ambitious plans for the Fijians, which included schools, medical
care, and agricultural development. The Colonial Office was emphatic
in its refusal to keep providing funds. "Sir Arthur Gordon," said one
highly placed official, "must be told in official language that he must
cut his coat according to his cloth."20
Now the tortuous process of accommodating pragmatic considera-
tions without jeopardizing native policy began in earnest. For Gordon
must have known that unless he could put Fiji on a sound financial
footing and placate both the settlers and the Colonial Office, his
native policy would not survive his own tenure in office. Since Fiji's
major asset was its agricultural potential, the obvious answer was to
encourage a cash crop which would rescue the planters and, above
all, provide income for the colony. If the Fijians could participate as
producers, so much the better. Indeed, one scholar of colonial Fiji
maintains that, far from being anti-development, Gordon's major
objective next to the establishment of his native policy, was the
attraction of new capital to Fiji. Such capital would have to come
from sources outside Fiji, for the planters themselves were almost
totally without assets. The solution to Gordon's economic woes was,
therefore, to be found in large-scale investment.21
The problem of dependable labor, however, continued to be a
stumbling block. Gordon aside, the Fijian chiefs, who were respon-
sible for the tax system, adamantly opposed the use of their village
labor on the plantations and finally forbade the practice outright. At
the same time, the other source of labor, islanders recruited from
elsewhere in the Pacific, ceased to be a viable alternative. The islander
labor trade had continued under government supervision and figured
in Fijian labor until 1879. But it could not begin to meet the demand
from the planters, much less accommodate the large-scale enterprises
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Gordon wanted to attract. Of the iooo laborers immediately needed
in 1877, for example, recruiters were able to supply only n o .
With declining island populations and competition from Queensland
where wages were twice those offered in Fiji, the situation was
unlikely to improve.22
Gordon, perhaps drawing upon his previous experience in Mauritius
and Trinidad, sought a solution in a new (for Fiji) practically limitless
source of supply: India. As early as 1875, he was urging the planters
to supplement island labor with that of Indian indentured laborers,
and in 1877 he proposed active recruitment of Indian laborers who
would be offered five-year contracts at one shilling a day for males
and nine pence for women. At the end of the contract period, they
would have the option to renew for another five years and have free
passage home at the end of ten years, or else they could remain in
Fiji. By these means, Gordon hoped to guarantee a steady labor
supply and thus justify the higher cost of transporting Indians (£14 a
head versus £7 for Islanders).23 Planters resistance to this expensive
proposition notwithstanding, the government proceeded with its
plans for Indian recruitment and financed the passage of the first
group of Indian laborers who arrived in Fiji in 1879.
Thus recruitment of Indian labor came about by government
initiative and was not a direct response to the planters who, despite
their pressing needs, resisted the idea. Why was Gordon so intent on
developing this new labor source? And why was plantation labor,
which he so vehemently opposed for Fijians, permissible for Islanders
and Indians? Gordon's position suggests hypocrisy. But again, this
labor policy reflects the balancing act by which he hoped to preserve
his native policy. Labor was the sine qua non for economic development.
Fijian labor was unacceptable. To resist successfully the planters
demands for Fijian labor and at the same time encourage investment,
an alternative labor force had to be found quickly. While either
Islander or Indian would have been acceptable, Islander labor could
not supply the demand, whereas India could export thousands of
workers without even denting her vast population. Moreover, the
effect of plantation labor on this group would not, in Gordon's view,
be particularly detrimental. While plantation labor threatened Fijian
communal life, the more individualistic Indians had little to lose on
this score.24 In economic terms, their lot in Fiji would surely be an
improvement over their life in India. In this Gordon shared the
position of the home government which, in the 1870s, was urging a
rather reluctant British administration in India to encourage
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emigration.25 Finally, given his previous experience with Indian
labor, Gordon must have felt that abuses could be controlled and
that the whole system could be administered humanely.
Indian labor can, therefore, be seen as the best solution for
Gordon's immediate problems. The planters would have labor
(albeit not of the type they preferred) and a chance for economic
recovery. Economic development and, hence, economic stability
would become more feasible. Indian laborers stood to better their
lot. And above all, Fijian society could proceed along its evolutionary
course free from the damaging effects of plantation labor. The
question to be examined is whether or not this "best of all possible
worlds" materialized.
HI. THE IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT OF GORDON'S POLICY
Certainly the promise of a readily available labor force did clear
the way for economic development in that it removed one of the
major obstacles to the production of what soon became Fiji's primary
cash crop. Even before Gordon's arrival on the scene, Fiji's European
population had shown an interest in sugar as a possible replacement
for cotton. It was well-established that sugar would grow there, and
its market possibilities were most attractive. Consumption of sugar
had been increasing throughout the 19th Century. In Britain, by
i860, yearly consumption per capita had reached 34.5 lbs. Growing
market demand in Australia and New Zealand promised to outstrip
domestic production in Queensland, and Fiji was strategically located
to take advantage of these markets.
As early as 1874, John Bates Thurston, who was to be one of
Gordon's most valuable aides and later govenor of Fiji, actively
sought large-scale investment in Fiji by the Colonial Sugar Refining
Company of Australia. In 1877, he proposed that the Fijian govern-
ment raise a substantial loan which would be used to guarantee a
3% return on private investment in sugar mills. The plan was vetoed
by the ever-parsimonious Colonial Office. Throughout the 1870s, a
number of investors, the CSR among them, continued to show some
interest in investment in Fiji. The concessions they demanded,
however, included control of a labor force the government would
supply (and which they assumed would be Fijian), government
guarantees of a steady supply of cane, and government assistance in
acquiring land and mill sites. All of this was too much for Gordon's
government.
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But by 1880, the government's attitude had become more flexible.
This may have been due to Gordon's sense of urgency as his term of
office drew to a close. Moreover, an outbreak of the same coffee leaf
disease which had destroyed coffee production in Ceylon effectively
eliminated coffee as an alternative cash crop and source of investment.
Labor, of course, no longer posed a major problem. In fact, the
government had found it difficult to employ all the Indian laborers
it had imported in 1879 and was most anxious to be relieved of the
cost of maintaining them. Hence, an agreement was reached with the
CSR in which the government promised to sell the company 1000
acres. The company was not obliged to take a quota of Fijian-
produced cane which had been one of Gordon's earlier stipulations,
reflecting his hope of integrating Fijians into the larger economy.
The CSR was most amenable to taking on the 200 Indian laborers
still on the government's hands and was soon requesting more.26
If, however, sugar was an economic boon, its introduction had
serious long-range consequences for practically every element of
Fijian colonial society and cast a long shadow over Gordon's vision.
A key factor in understanding these consequences is the matter of
scale. CSR and the other companies which invested in Fiji were large
scale and thus able to utilize capital and other resources not available
to smaller enterprises. In very short order the smaller planters found
themselves unable to compete, particularly in securing labor. When
long-term government assistance was not forthcoming to help defray
the cost of expensive Indian labor, they found themselves priced out
of the labor market by the large sugar companies. Of the 500 laborers
introduced in Fiji in 1884, for example, only 20 or 30 went to small
planters. Many of these planters eventually became company
employees themselves. Thus, the independent European planter
never became a factor in Fijian sugar production. It has been suggested
that this outcome was not welcomed by Gordon's successors or the
Colonial Office. For despite their opposition to the native policy, it
had been hoped that the planters would provide a counter-balance
to the impersonal, absentee interests of the sugar companies. But "in
a field bounded by Treasury's caution and Gordon's Fijian policy,
the victory went to those who provided the most and asked the least."27
Clearly the sugar companies did just that. Increasingly, they
provided most of the government's revenue. Thus, the solvency of the
Fijian government became linked to sugar profits. Gordon's pre-
cedents on land alienation and Fijian labor held, but in countless
other ways the sugar companies' interests had to be accommodated.
In these circumstances, whatever humane intentions Gordon and his
successors may have had towards Fiji's Indian laborers were swept
aside. The circumstances in which they were recruited were dubious,
and the conditions in which they lived and worked were harsh indeed.
Indian labor was recruited, for the most part, from the most
depressed areas of India among people left landless by population
pressure and indebtedness. It is arguable in strictly economic terms
that Fiji was indeed the land of opportunity the recruiters promise.
In human terms, the indenture system is much less defensible. Family
life in the early years was virtually impossible given the small number
of women recruited and the lack of accomodations for those families
who did emigrate together. Living conditions were generally de-
plorable. And worst of all, the nature and amount of work to be done
was solely determined by the companies. Despite the efforts of a few
conscientious immigration officials, little was done to correct abuses.
The government's sympathies lay with the companies. In May 1886,
for example, 130 immigrants from the Rewa Sugar Company
marched to Suva carrying knives and hoes to protest an increase in
the despised "task" system in which workers were paid only if they
completed a set task in a set time. The government response was to
pass an ordinance penalizing laborers for insufficient labor and
forbiding groups of more than five laborers to stage a protest or to
carry tools when doing so.28
Conditions became so bad that even the Colonial Office stirred
itself to protest that unless conditions among Fiji's immigrants
improved, it was likely that the government of India would forbid
recruitment. But Calcutta took no such action. Nor did the Colonial
Office ever back its protest with funds for the better regulation of
indentured labor.29
Until 1916, this "human subsidy" on which Gordon's native policy
depended remained largely forgotten. Aside from the odd government
official, the Indian laborers had no advocates. When the indenture
system was abolished in 1916, it was largely in response to growing
Indian nationalism and not out of British concern for the plight of
Fiji's Indian laborers. Perhaps there can be no more stinging indict-
ment of the system's failings than that the suicide statistics for Indians
in the indenture period; the rate was nine times that of Madras. It
was not without reason that the immigrants themselves referred to
life in the labor lines as "narak" (Hell).30
The indenture system had an impact on the social structure of Fiji
as well as on the laborers themselves. Here again scale is an important
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factor to consider. Of all the products of tropical agriculture which
had become important for Europeans, sugar lent itself best to the
plantation unit staffed by a large organized work force. Sugar
involved a number of repetitious tasks requiring considerable labor.
And in "crop time" it was necessary to work non-stop in order to
process the cut cane before its quality declined.
When large-scale sugar production first developed in the West
Indies, that work force was supplied by slave labor. Indeed, the
indentured labor system itself developed in the 19th Century as a
response to the void left by the abolition of slavery.31 The significance
of this for Fiji is that labor had to be imported in large numbers to
meet the demands of sugar production. Between 1879 and 1916,
60,000 Indians entered Fiji. Of these only a small percentage returned
to India.
It is unlikely that this is what Gordon envisioned. The exact status
of these laborers in Fiji was not worked out when he embarked on his
program. The question of whether emigration was to be temporary
or permanent colonization was never settled and consequently
neither was the question of Indian rights in the colony.32 In other
British colonies, Indian workers had received grants of Crown land
in lieu of passage home at the end of their contract period and were,
to some degree, absorbed into the local scene. Fiji's Indians were cut
off from this possibility by Gordon's non-alientation of land policy.
So Fijian society now included a new, growing, culturally distinct
element which was cut off from both traditional Fijian society and
the British power structure. This volatile situation continues to be an
important part of Fiji's colonial legacy.
When Gordon left Fiji in 1880, Gladstone wrote, "I think your
spirit and feeling toward the natives is an honour to the Empire, so
sadly disgraced in other quarters."33 But Gordon himself was far less
sure of his achievement. "The poor people whose rights I have striven
to maintain and whose existence I have tried to preserve are not the
less surely stripped of those rights and this is failure."34
These "honor and failure" designations still characterize appraisals
of Gordon's administration. There are those who maintain that
Gordon understood very little of the true nature of Fijian culture and
that by imposing on it his artificial, overly protective system he
weakened its ability to adapt to a changing world.35 Even Gordon's
contemporaries questioned the value of the native policy for its
intended beneficiaries. The report of the Commission of Fiji in 1896
stated that for a generation the Fijians had been "progressing on the
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stumps of their own customs assisted by fragments of European
innovations."36 Others, however, point out that Gordon's primary
goal, the survival of the Fijian people in their own land, was attained.
If his system was make-shift in terms of Fijian tradition, they argue,
it must be remembered that Gordon had only a few years in which to
create a buffer for a threatened people. His goal was not to recreate
traditional society but to stabilize a situation that was out of hand.37
It would seem, however, that the exact nature and function of the
native policy was far less critical for Fiji in the long run than Gordon's
decision to introduce both Indian labor and large-scale agriculture.
They were perfectly logical choices at the time, and to question
Gordon's good intentions would be petty. But in doing so he laid the
groundwork for a system where the identity of interests between the
chiefs, the government, and the sugar companies made change
difficult. Both Fijian commoners and Indian laborers tended to get
left out. But the latter, once the miserable early years passed, became
a dynamic force in Fiji in both economic and numerical terms. Yet
they remained outside this coalition of interests. It is not a problem
that has yet resolved itself, and there are those who see in it a
20th-century threat to Fijian culture. At the very least, Gordon's
solutions to the immediate problems of his own day entailed new
difficulties for Fiji.
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